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0         Scale Effects, Technical Efficiency and Land Lease in China       Xiaobing Wang   Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy   Institute of Geographical Science and Natural Resource Research   Chinese Academy of Sciences   Email:   xbwang.ccap@igsnrr.ac.cn         Xiaohua Yu *   Junior Professor   Courant Research Centre  “ Poverty, Equity an d Growth”   Georg - August - Universität Göttingen   Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3, 37073 Göttingen, Germany   Phone: +49 - 551 - 39 14066   Fax: +49 - 551 - 39 14059   Emai l:  xyu@gwdg.de               Paper prepared for presentation at the  EAAE 2011 Congress   Change and Uncertainty   Challenges for Agriculture,   Food and Natural Resources     August 30 to September 2, 2011   ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland     Copyright 2011 by [ Xiaobing Wang and Xiaohua Yu ].  All rights reserved.  Readers may  make verbatim copies of this document for non - commercial purposes by any means, provided  that this copyright notice appears on all such copies.         *Corresponding Autho r  1     Sc ale Effects, Technical Efficiency and Land Lease in China     Abstract:   Using a panel dataset from Zhejiang  p rovince   in   China over the period 1995 - 2002, we   propose a two - step estimation   procedure   to   investigate the links between land lease activity  and produc tion efficiency .   We   find that  the  output elasticity with respect to land, the scale  effect and   the   technical efficiency are higher for farmers  involved in   land - lease activities. In  addition, technical efficiency and land - lease activity are endogenous, and  farmers with higher  technical efficiency are more likely to lease more land and adopt advanced technologies to  achieve higher profit s , which in turn alters the technical efficiency.      Key Word:   Land Lease, Land Use Rights, Technical Efficiency, Scale Effec t.      Jel Code:   Q15, P23, D50.     1.   Introduction   The success of Chinese agricultural development has been attributed to a series of  radical land reform s   aiming at egalitarian principles   ( Lin, 1992 ).  At t he core of the reform s   lied   the coexistence of land owner ship , which  remain ed   collective at the village   level,   and  land use rights , which were   equally distributed  among   individual farmers. Under this strict  separation   of land title and distribution, land trade or more generally the transfer of   a   land  title,  as  a   potential  instrument  to  improve  efficiency  and  productivity  growth,  is  legally  prohibited. Th is   prohibition of land title transfer is of vital importan ce   for Chinese policy  makers ,   as land is traditionally regarded  to be   the most fundamental way to secure   the lives  and  livelihoods  of  millions  of  Chinese  smallholder   engaged   in  agricultural  production  (Brandt et al., 2002).  The  regime   of  land use rights designed by the Chinese government and  the evolution of  the  land rental market provide a unique opportunit y to explore the causality  between transfer s   of land use rights  taking the form of   land - lease activit ies   and changes in  production efficiency.    The current institution s regarding the   transfer of land use rights ha ve   an important  implication for improvement   of land productivity and economic efficiency to ensure food  security and satisfy increasing food demand induced by fast economic growth ( Huang and  Rozelle,  1995 ;  Jacoby  et  al.,  2002 ).    The  incidence  of  land - lease  activity,  which  is  an   indicator  of  the  fu nctioning  of  land  markets,  has  obvious  consequences  in  changing  production  technology  and  other  input  use,  which  ultimately  affects  farmers’  profits.  By  allowing farmers to achieve their desired levels of land input , or in other words to employ the   profit - maximizing amount of land in production,  the  transfer of land use rights permits a  more  efficient  allocation  of  resources  among  farm er s.  Empirical  studies  have  well  documented that the functioning of land lease markets at   the   farmer or village level increa ses  technical efficiency (Bruemmer et al., 2006; Zhang et al., 2011). The transfer of land use  rights  is  an  important  instrument  to  achieve  an  efficient  allocation  of  resources  and  potential ly also   to enhance production scale efficiency (Fleisher and Liu,  1992; Wan and  Cheng, 2001;  Silor   et al., 2009 ).    However ,  there is a problem  regarding the  analy sis of   causalities between production  efficiency and land lease activity. When analyzing farm operation decisions about  transfer s   of  land use rights, it is nat ural to consider  on the one hand  whether less efficient farmers are  indeed more likely to lease more land in order to improve the scale effect, especially  under 2     the condition   of fragmented agricultural production, and catch up with more efficient farmers   i n terms of income .  On the other hand,   it might be the case that  farmers with the capacity of  organizing  the ir   production  closer  to  the  production  frontier  tend  to  lease  more  land .   E xpanded farm size   might in this case   induce the adoption of new labor - savin g technolog ies ,  such as medium -   or large - size d   machinery (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985).    In particular, the disagreement  regarding   the relationship between land lease activity  and technical efficiency makes it necessary to recognize that land lease decisions m ight be  endogenous  with  respect  to  production  efficiency   and   vice  vers a .  The  a doption  of  new  technologies induced by an increase in scale will, of course, change the technical efficiency,  which  is  one  of  the  important  components  of  productivity  growth.  The   analysis  of  determinants  of  technical  efficiency  without  consider ation  of   the  endogeneity  problem  is  inadequate  for   modeling   Chinese agricultural production. When the feedback effects of land  lease choice on production efficiency  are   not taken into accoun t, the traditional method s, that  are   estimating the land lease choices by binary models or the demand for leased land by Tobit  model s,   are not satisfactory.       In this study,  we aim  at   gain ing   a deeper understanding of the   relationship   between  land lease  activity, scale and technical efficiency of agricultural production and empirically  investigate  th is   relationship  using  panel  household  and  village  survey  data  collected  in  Zhejiang  province  by  the   Chinese   Ministry  of  Agriculture  in   the  time  period  from   19 95   through  2002.  Our  theoretical  framework  provides  a  formal  conceptual  analysis  of  the   endogeneity by allowing land lease activity and technical efficiency to affect each other and  by  identifying  the  equilibrium  between  land  lease  activity  and  technical  e fficiency.  Our  empirical model considers the different technologies determined by the land lease choices  and tests the systematic differences between them. Consequently,  we employ a structural  equation system to estimate the technical efficiency and land l ease decisions simultaneously.     To meet these objectives, the rest of the paper will be organized as follows. In section  two, we lay out economic models and identify the equilibria. The next section presents the  dataset  and  describes  the  incidence  of  land   lease  activity.  Section  four  discusses  the  endogeneity between the incidence of land lease activity and technical efficiency. The final  section concludes.     2.   Models   2.1 Modeling Production    Even  though  production  efficiency  comprises  technical  efficiency,  a llocative  efficiency and scale efficiency in the current literature ( Kumbhakar and  Lovell, 2003), we  will mainly look into the technical efficiency and scale effects because the inputs market is  not perfect and we do not have the information of input price s in our data set . In order to  empirically  examine  the  links  between  scale  effects,  technical  efficiency  and  land  lease  incidence, we first model farmers’ production, which is specified in a Translog form. Given  the   panel structure of the data, the model us ed in this study is the Panel Stochastic Frontier  Model (PSFM) with time - vary ing   technical efficiency proposed by Battese and Coelli (1992).  The physical inputs include cultivated land area comprising both owned land and leased land  subject  to  the  incidenc e  of  land  lease  activity,  labor  input,  capital  and  expense  on  intermediate  inputs  including  fertilizer,  pesticides  and  seeds.  The  production  function  is  specified as    0 ln ln ln ln it j jit jn jit nit i it it j j n j Y X X X t v u b b g l a ³ = + + + + + - å åå      (1)   where  it Y is total agricultural r evenue for farmer  i at time  t ; jit X is the physical input  j ;  j b   and  jn g are related coefficients. A time trend is ad ded to capture the technical progress, and 3     i a   captures the fixed - effects of farmer i . Furthermore,  it v is a random term with a normal  distribution  2 ~ (0, ) it v v N s   and  it u is a non - negative term capturing the technical efficiency.  Following Battese and Coelli (1992), we assume technical efficiency changes over time for  each farmer i ,    exp{ ( )} it i i u t T u h = - -                                                                                         (2)   where  i T   is  the  last  observed  period  for  farmer i ;  h is  a  term denoting  the  decay  rate of  technical efficiency; and  i u follows a truncated normal distribution with  variance  2 v s . Then  the technical efficiency can be expressed as exp( ) it it E u = - .   2.2 Output Elasticity and Scale effect   Given the production function in E quation (1), output elasticity with respect to input  j   is   ln ln j it jit d Y e d X =      2 ln ln j jj jit jn nit n j X X b g g ¹ = + + å    .                                                                    (3)   Following Kim (1992), the scale effect can be  written as   ln ln it it j jit d Y d X q = å      ln 2 ln j jn nit jj jit j j n j j X X b g g ¹ = + + å åå å    .                                                    (4)     2.3 Technical Efficiency   and Land Lease   Even though  Kumbhakar   et al. (2008) proposed a one - step  method to  joint ly estimate   the product ion function  and organic choice function   to correct the possible endogeneity  of  organic choice  for dairy farming , the method cannot be used here.   The   reason for this is that  it  would   impl y   that  technological  efficiencies  are  different  but  the  adopted  techn ologies  between the two types of farmers are identical.  In fact,   this   is not realistic. N ot only technical  efficiency, but also adopted technologies   could be systematically different between organic  and conventional farmers, and similarly  between lease far mer s   and non - lease farmers   in this  study .    We use the traditional   two - step method: S tep   1: E stimat e   Equation (1) separately for  lease  farmers  and non - lease farmers .   Step 2: Estimate the  lease  function by instrumental  variable regressions.  The first step es timates  de facto   technical efficiencies for each type of  farmers.   If the technologies are systematically different for the two types of farmers, the  sample selection problem pointed out by  Kumbhakar   et al. (2008) does not exist any longer   as they are gener ated from different processes .  After the estimated technical efficiency for  each farmer in hand by Equation (2), we will examine the link between lease decision and  technical efficiency.   In order to address the possible endogeneity, we specify a structura l  equation system comprising a land lease function and a technical efficiency function.       First, it is reasonable that farmers with high efficiency are more likely to lease more  land to employ the profit - maximiz ing   amount of land in production under the in stitution al   restriction of egalitarian rules of land allocation among farmers. However, only a few farmers  lease land, so that the land lease function is specified as a Tobit model,   4     * it it it it L E Z b d e = + +                                                                 (5.a)   * * * 0; 0 0. it it it it L if L L if L ì > ï = í £ ï î   where * it L is a latent variable. If  * 0 it L > , the lease d   land area  it L   can be observed; otherwise,  there  is  no  lease  activity;  d   is  the  coefficient  for  technical  efficiency. it Z is  a  vector  of  exogenous  variables  determining  land  lease  activity,  such  as  off - farm  employment  opportunities ,   and  b is a vector of the corresponding coeffic ients.  it e   is a random term with a  normal distribution 2 ~ (0, ) it N e e s . 1   Furthermore ,   there is a feedback impact of  the size of the  leased land   area   on technical  efficiency ,   which  is   assumed to be nonlinear. Usually ,   in eco nomic theory, a relatively small  amount  of  lease d   land  can  incentivize  farmers  to  improve  technical  efficiency   as  the  technology is not changed .   H owever, a large  amount   of land may rapidly increase the costs of  management  and  supervision  beyond  the  farmers ’  ability,  which  makes  production  less  efficient. In particular, large farms often introduce advanced technologies, such as advanced  machineries or hybrid seeds, requiring advanced human capital and complicated skills, which  are limited for many farmers,  t hereby  possibly reducing efficiency (Xu and Jeffery, 1999).  Thus, we hypothesize that technical efficiency  follows   a quadratic function of   the   size of the   leased land   area ,  implying   that   as the   size of the   leased land  area   increases, the technical  efficien cy  first  increases  and  then  decreases.  The  technical  efficiency  function  can  be  specified   as   ~ ~ ~ ~ 2 1 2 it it it it i it E L L Z b r r a e = + + + +                   (5.b)   where  1 r   a s well as   2 r are parameters and  2 0 r < ;  ~ it Z is a vector of exogenous variables  determining farmers’ technical efficiency as in other studies, such as farmers’ human capital  and labor participation rate; and  ~ b is a vector of the corresponding coeff icients.  ~ i a captures  the fixed effects and  ~ it e   is a random term with a normal distribution ~ 2 ~ ~ ~ (0, ) it N e e s .   The relation ship between   land lease activity and technical efficiency in Equation (5.a)  and  (5.b)  is   shown in Figure 1, which indicates that there are two equilibria :   A and B. In  particular, A is an unstable equilibrium   whereas   B is a stable one.  After  solv ing   the system   consisting of Equations   (5.a) and (5.b),  we find that  the stable equilibrium   is  given by    ~ ~ ~ 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 '2 2 [ 2 ( ) 1] [ 2 ( ) 1] 4 [ ( ) ( ) ] 2 it it it i it it Z b Z b Z b Z b Z b E r d r d r d r d r d a r r r d - + - - + - - + + + =   (6.a)   and   ~ ~ ~ 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 '2 [ 2 ( ) 1] [ 2 ( ) 1] 4 [ ( ) ( ) ] ( ) 2 it it it i it it it Z b Z b Z b Z b Z b L Z b r d r d r d r d r d a r r r d - + - - + - - + + + = +   (6.b)   In the rest of this paper we will use a panel dataset from China to empirically exam ine   the determinants  of land lease incidents  and  their  impact s   on efficiency.                                                          1   Due to the Incidental Parameter Problem, the fixed - effects model for the Tobit model (3.a) ca nnot be applied.   5     3. Data    The data used in this study  are   drawn from  the  fixed - point survey data series  in  Zhejiang Province in  China, conducted annually by rural survey teams   from the Chinese  Ministry of Agriculture .   After cleaning the data, we establish an unbalanced panel with  2,320  observations from 1995 to 2002. Table A1 presents the definitions of the variables used in  this study.    It   indicates that both the incidents of lease activities and the average size of   the   leased  land  area  ha ve   substantially increas ed over the course   of   our observation period. Particularly,  the percentage of lease farmers increased from 14.7% in 1995 to 27.1% in 2002, and about  one - fifth  of  farmers had  taken part in  land lease activities. The average size of  the  leased land  area  has  more than doubled  from 1.28 mu in 1995 to 2.61 mu in 2002 , implying an improved  functioning of   the   land lease market . The increase in land lease activities provides evidence  for   the development of land lease markets and the emerging specialization of agricultural  production   in China (Kung, 2002). In addition, it also  motivates the studies by raising the  questions : who experienced the specialization   and benefitted from it , and  which farmers   are  more efficient  in organizing agricultural production ?   Th e se questions will be answ ered in the  remaining sections of   this study.       4. Estimation and Discussion   4.1 Estimation of  the  production function    I n  order  to  scrutinize  the  link  between  farmers’  lease   behavior ,   scale  effects  and  technical efficiency, we first need to obtain the tec hnical efficiency by estimating the  PSFM – Equation ( 1 ).  The inputs include land, labor, capital and intermediate inputs.   A time trend  variable is also included to capture the technical innovations.     The results are shown in Table  1 , which includes three  es timation  models: full sample  model, No n - Lease   Sample Model and  Lease   sample model   because we speculate that there  may exist structural differences   both for technical efficiency and for technologies   between  n o n - lease   farmers   and  lease   farmers.    Compared wit h the  results  of  the  f ixed - effects   models, the PSFMs perform better  because more variables are statistically significant.  Regarding the   diagnos is of  the structural  differences between the non - lease farmers and lease farmers, the result of a likelihood rati o  test rejects the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference between them , which  also authenticates the legitimation of the two - step estimation . Thus,  we   accept the alternative  hypothesis that there  are  structural differences  between   the  leas e -   and  non - lease farmers ,  which   might  be  caused  by  differences  in  technology  and/or  technical  efficiency.  The  following discussion will be based on the results from the separated estimations in the PSFMs.   In order to avoid numerical difficulties in the max imum likelihood estimations, and to  facilitate the interpretation of the parameter estimates, the output variable and the four input  variables are  represented  by their respective sample means .  Hence, based on    Equation (3) we  can calculate the output elast icities with respect to each input   as elasticities at the point of  normalization, i.e. at the sample mean . The results are quite consistent between non - lease  farmers and lease farmers.  With a value above 0.30 for   both   non - lease  and   lease farmers in  Zhejian g Province, the output elasticity with respect to intermediate inputs is the highest in  all inputs .   O ther important inputs are labor and land .   Interestingly, the output elasticity with  respect to capital is slightly negative, indicating that capital in Zhe jiang province is slightly  overused. Given the fact that Zhejiang province is one of the richest provinces in China, it is  plausible that capital  for agricultural production could be in abundant supp l y .      4. 2   Scale effects   Using equation (4), we can calcu late the scale effects for both non - lease and lease  farmers  at the mean  of  the  input variables.   The  results  show that  the return to scale  is 6     fluctuating over the observation period both for non - lease and for lease farmers. However, as  expected, the return s to scale for lease farmers are in general higher than those for non - lease  farmers over this period except for the year 2001.    Furthermore, a t - test finds that the mean return to scale for lease farmers  ( 0.854 )   is  significantly  higher   than   tha t   for  non - le ase  farmers   (0.830).   The  level  of   statistical  significan ce   is 1% .  This   implies that farmers with leased land do benefit from scale effects,  which is  consistent with the reality that agricultural production is still  conducted on   small - size d   and  fragmented   p lots  of   farm  land.  Once  scale  economy  may  be  present,  it  could  transmit into improvement of productivity growth.    4. 3   Technical efficiency   Our  results indicate that  the  technical efficiencies   of   both non - lease and lease farmers  dec reased   over the observed  period .   This is  consistent with the assumption of the econometric  model of Battese and Coelli (1992). Comparing non - lease with lease farmers,  we find that  the  technical efficiency of lease farmers is in general much higher t han that of non - lease farmers.   T he mean technical efficiency  of   lease farmers is 0.829 over the observed period,  whereas the  corresponding efficiency of   non - lease farmers   is 0.518. A t - test finds that the difference is  significant   at the 1% level.    Furthermore,  by  comparing the se   results   with the  previous  literature (Bruemmer et al.,  2006), we find that the technical efficiency of lease farmers is  in accordance with  recent  findings .   T he technical efficiency of non - lease farmers   however   is significantly lower.  This   could   be explained by th e fact s   that lease farmers are specialized in agricultural production  and  that  agriculture  represents   their  main   source  of   income.  Hence,  they  have   a   higher  technical efficiency.  A large proportion  of the non - lease farmers in Zhejiang province only  regard   agriculture as a part - time job and most of their income is from off - farm employment.  This in turn suggest s   that  they do not have incentives to improve their technical efficiency.   T he  obtained  technical efficienc ies allow   us to  estimate the simultaneous equ ation s :  lease behavior function (5.a) and technical efficiency function (5.b).    4. 4   Lease Behavior   We first take a look at the lease behavior function (5.a), which is a Tobit model with  technical efficiency as  an endogenous variable. Smith and Blundell (19 86) and Ne wey   ( 1987 )  proposed  a  two - step  method  to  estimate  Equation  (5.a ),  but  their  estimators  are  not  as  efficient as the maximum likelihood estimators , which will be used here . A comprehensive  review can be  found   in  Wooldridge (2002, p.532).       T he func tioning of land lease market under  the constraints of  imperfect  labor  markets   has been well explored in the existing literature   (Yao, 2000   and  2004 ;  Kung, 2002;  Vranken  and  Swinnen, 2006 ). The conclu sion,  which has  been drawn, is   that the  determinants of  participation in land lease market  are   affected by the household heterogeneity, including the  age and education al   attainment of the household head, and the allocation of working time  between on -   and off - farm jobs. Farmers’ behavior with regard to land leas e is also affected by  the land endowment of  their  households   in terms of   land per capita and quality of land.  Leasing land from the owners of adjacent plots in order to expand  the  cultivated area is a  potential solution to the land fragmentation that resul ted from the current land allocation  system in rural China (Wan and Cheng, 2001). Furthermore, access to the land lease market  could also be influenced by village characteristics like  the  development of labor markets, the  location of the village  or   the  pop ulation density   (Wang et al., 2007) .  According to these  conceptual notes, the factors  which   determine lease behavior ,   including household, farm and  village characteristics,  are introduced in the empirical estimation .   The instrument   used   for technical effic iency is the cluster technical efficiency, which  is measured  as   the average technical efficiency of other farmers in  a given   village  and   year .   It  can be  obtained from the PSFM   and   is believed to be correlated with technical efficiency but 7     not  with  the erro r term   of   the   equation .   This  approach  allows us to evaluate whether and to  what extent technical efficiency influences the land lease decision.  The estimation   results are  reported in Table  2 .    A likelihood  ratio test  rejected  the  null hypothesis  that  the t echnical efficiency  is  exogenous at the 1% level and  thus  accepted the alternative hypothesis of endogeneity, even  though the estimation results  of   the two models are quite consistent. The following discussion  will be based on the results of the IV estimat ion.   The coefficient   estimate   for technical efficiency is 15.47 and statistically significant at  the 1% level. As the changes in technical efficiency are usually very small, the marginal  impact of  changes in  technical efficiency on land lease activity is a lso small .   Nevertheless, it  is   statistically significant, which implies that farmers with higher technical efficiency are  more likely to lease  more  land and  to  specialize in agricultural production.    4. 5   Determinants of Technical Efficiency    Here  we  start  to  analyze  the  determinants  of  technical  efficiency  by  estimat ing   Equation (5.b). The  endogenous variables are  l ease  a rea and  squared  l ease  a rea . S imilar to  other  recent  studies  on   technical efficiency   (Zhang et al.,  2011 ) , the exogenous variables  include  h ousehold  s ize,  l and  s ize per  p arcel,  a verage  h ousehold  e ducation,  education and age  of the  h ousehold  h ead,  c apital,   allocation of capital, allocation of agricultural land, land rent ,  and  o wn  l and  s ize.    The nonlinearity of the endogenous variable  renders  the   estimati o n   of   Equation (5.b)   somewhat difficult . Following the method  described by   Wooldridge (2002, p.233), we take  the second - order term of   the   lease   a rea as a new endogenous variable and use the variables of  h ousehold  l abor  s hare,  o ff  f arm  w age,  s ha dow  rent ,  s hadow  w age,  logarithm   of  l evies,  as well  as   the  second - order  and  interaction  terms   of  these  variables   as  instruments  for  the  endogenous  variables.  The  results  of  several  models  including  pooled  and  fixed - effects  es timation are reported in Table  3 .   F - tests reject the pooled regressions and favor the fixed - effects models. Furthermore,  Hausman  tests  reject  the  null  hypothesis  of  exogeneity  and  thus  support   the  alternative  hypothesis  of  endogeneity.  F or  comparison,  we  also  estimate  a  restricted  model   only  includ ing   the first - order term of  lease   a rea, but a t - test indicate s   that there is a non - linear  relationship  between  lease   a rea  and  technical  efficiency.  Consequently,  t he  following  discussion is based on the fixed - effects  i nstrumental   v ariable regre ssion for the non - linear  model.   First of all, the coefficients for   the   first - order and second - order term s   of lease area   are  0.0 393   and  – 0.00 07,  respectively, and both are statistically significant   at the 1% level .  This  indicates that there is an inverted - U   shape relationship between  the a rea   of leased land   and  technical efficiency.  More precisely, when   the  lease   area  increases   technical efficiency first  increases and then decreases ,   which is   consistent with our theoretical framework. If  we were  to  ignor e   th e feedback effect of technical efficiency on land  lease   activity, farmers c ould   reach  the  maximum  technical  efficiency  at  a   leased  land  area  of   27 .1  mu ,  which  is  the  benchmark of the  non - small farm holders  as  defined by  the  World Bank (2003) .   Even  though  this scale is still low in the international standard ,   but being reasonable enough to enhance the  econom y   of scale without changing the current land tenure system in rural China.   Moreover,  the  results  also  indicate  that  only  own  land  size  and  a llocation  of   agricultural  land   are  marginally  significant.  Specifically,  own  land  size  is  negative ly  correlated with technical efficiency , which  could  be explained by the fact that farmers with  more  own  land  are  often   characterized  by  a   lower  technical  efficiency.  All ocation  of  agricultural land  has a positive impact on technical efficiency, indicat ing   that   farmers who  allocate more land to grain production have higher technical efficiency,  which  reflects the 8     fact  that the production proce ss   of  cash  crops is usually mo re complicate d   than that of grain  crops .   4. 6     Equilibrium of Lease Behavior and Technical Efficiency   Our theoretical framework indicates that there is a stable equilibrium in the long run,  which is given  by   Equations (6.a) and (6.b). Taking the mean of al l variables and using  Equations (6.a) and (6.b), we can calculate the equilibrium point between technical efficiency  and   the size of   the  lease d   land   area . If we use the values of  the  full lease samples as the  baseline, the technical efficiency will increas e from 0.83 to 0.85 and the   mean  size of   leased  land will increase from 1.90 mu to 2.17 mu  to reach   the long - run equilibrium.    These results imply that farmers in Zhejiang Province can still increase their technical  efficiency and   mean size of   leased land  before  reach ing   the  stable  long - run equilibrium.   Even  though  the  current  average  farm  size  is  quite  small,   farm  restructure  in  the  production  practice  would be the orientation of policy initiative.      5. Conclusion   The  t ransfer  of  land  property  in  a  well - de veloped  market  may  help   to   increase  economic efficiency and   to   ensure food security. However, the under - developed land market s   and institutional restrictions in many developing economies,  including   China, often prevent  the   transfer   of land titles   and cause   a loss of economic efficiency. Land lease ,   or   in other  words the   transfer of land use rights ,   might be an alternative tool to improve   the   economic  efficiency of land use.   In  particular ,  a   reverse - causality   might  exist   between  land  lease  behavior  and  produ ctivity,   or to be more precisely, between land lease behavior and   technical efficiency.  Farmers with  a  higher technical efficiency are more likely to lease more land to enjoy scale  effects and  to  adopt more technologically advanced  producing  methods, which   in turn alter  the technical efficiency, usually downward.    Using a panel dataset from Zhejiang Province, China   between  1995   and  2002, we  proposed a two - step estimation   procedure   and  set up a structural economic model to identify  the  causalities  between  th e  size  of  the  leased  land   area   and  technical  efficiency  and  to  empirically estimate their complicated relationship. The estimation results are consistent with  our hypothesis that the relationship between technical efficiency and   the size of the   leased  land   area   is   endogenous.  Specifically,  higher  technical  efficiency  on  the  one  hand  incentivize s   famers to lease more land, and on the other hand, as the size of  the  leased land   area   increases, farmers’ technical efficiency first increases  and later  decreases.  The system  has a stable   long - run   equilibrium at which technical efficiency and  the size of the  leased land   area   are   slightly higher than in the current situation.  In other words, both technical efficiency  and   the   average size of   the   leased land  area  can b e slightly improved in the long run.     Finally, we also find that both the output elasticity with respect to land and the returns  to scale for lease farmers are significantly higher than those for non - lease farmers, which are  also important  factors   in  the  e xpla nation of   land lease behavior in China.     References:   Battese G. E. and T. J. Coelli. 1992 .   Frontier Production Functions, Technical Efficiency and  Panel Data: With Application to Paddy Farmers in India. Journal  of Productivity  Analysis ,   Vol.3:153 - 169.   Benjamin, D., & Brandt, L. 2002 . Property rights, labor markets, and ef fi ciency in a   transition  economy: The case of rural China.  Canadian Journal of Economics , 35 (4) :  689−716.   Brandt, L., Huang, J., Li, G., Rozelle, S., 2002.  Land rights in rural China: F acts, fictions and  issues.  China Journal ,  Vol. 47: 67 - 97.  9     Brummer  B, Glauben  T,  Lu W.,2006.  Policy  reform and productivity change in Chinese  agriculture: A distance function approach.  Journal of Development Economics , 81(1):  61 – 79.   Carter, Michael R. and Y ang Yao.  2002.   Local versus Global Separability in Agricultural  Household Models: The Factor Price Equalization Effect on Land Transfer Rights.  American Journal of Agricultural Economics. Vol.   84:   702 – 715 .   Fleisher, B.M., and Yunhua, Liu ,  1992 .   Economies o f scale, plot size, human capital and  productivity in Chinese agriculture.  Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance ,  Vol .  32: 112 - 123.   Hayami, Yuj iro and  Ruttan, Vernon   W., 1985 .  Agricultural development: An international  perspective . Baltimore7   The Johns   Hopkins University Press.   Huang,  Jikun,  Rozelle,  Scott,  1995.  Environmental  Stress  and  Grain  Yields  in  China.  American Journal of Agricultural Economics   77, 853 - 864 .   Huang, J., Wang, X., Zhi, H., Huang, Z., and Rozelle, S., 2011.  Subsidies and distortions   in  China’s  agriculture:   evidence  from  producer - level  data.  Australian  Journal  of  Agricultural and Resource Economics   55, 53 - 71.    Jin  S.  and  K.  Deininger ,   200 9 .   Land  rental  markets  in  the  process  of  rural  structural  transformation: Productivity and equity  impacts from China.   Journal of Comparative  Economics , vol. 37(4) :   629 - 646   Jacoby, H. G., Li, G., & Rozelle, S. (2002). Hazards of expropriation: Tenure insecurity and  investment in rural China. The Ame rican Economic Review, 92(5),   1420 - 1447.   Kim H. Y. ,  1992 .  The Translog Production Function and Variable Returns to Scale .   The  Review of Economics and Statistics , Vol. 74( 3):546 - 552.   Kumbhakar  S.  C.  and  C.A.  K.  Lovell ,  2003 .   Stochastic  Frontier  Analysis ,  C ambridge  University Press.   Kumbhakar S. C.  et al. 2008.  Joint estimation of technology choice and technical efficiency:  an  application  to  organic  and  conventional  dairy  farming.   Journal  of  Productivity  Analysis   .  Volume 31(3 ):  151 - 161 .   Kung,  James  Kai - sing.  2000.  Common Property  Rights  and  Land  Realloca tions  in  Rural  China: Evidence from a Village Survey.  World Development, Vol.  28: 701 - 719.   Lin,  Justin,  Yifu. ,  1992)  Rural  Reforms  and  Agricultural  Growth  in  China.  American  Economic Review  82 (1), 34 - 51.   Liu,  Shouying ,   Carter,  Michael ,  Yao,  Yang,  1998.  Di mension  and  Diversity  of  Property  Right in Rural China: Dilemmas on the Road to Further Reform.  World Development   26, 1789 - 1806.   Newey  W.  K. ,  1987.   Efficient  estimation  of  limited  dependent  variable  models  with  endogenous explanatory variables.  Journal of  Econometrics   36: 231 – 250.   Sikor, T.,     Müller, D. ,   Stahl, J. 2009 .  Land Fragmentation and Cropland Abandonment in  Albania: Implications for the Role s of State and Community in Post - Socialist Land  Consolidation.  World Development , 37/8 :  1411 - 1423.   Smith R. and R. Blundell .  1986 .   An Exogeneity Test for a Simultaneous Equation Tobit  Model with an Application to Labor Aupply .   Econometrica   Vol.54:679 - 685.    Tan,  Shuhao,  Nico  Heerink,  Gideon  Kruseman,  and  Futian  Qu.  2008.  Do  fragmented  landholdings  have  higher  production  costs?  Evidence  from  rice  farmers  in  Northeastern   Jianxi province, P.R. China.   China Economic Review. Vol.   19:   347 – 358.   Vranken, L.   and   Swin nen, J. 2006. Land Rental Markets in Transition: Theory and   Evidence from Hungary.  World Development  34 (3): 481 - 500.   Wan, Guang H. and Enjiang Cheng.  2001. Effects of land fragmentation and returns to scale  in the Chinese farming sector.   Applied Economics . Vol.   33:   183 – 194.  10     Wang, X., Herzfeld, T., Glauben, T., 2007.  Labor allocation in transition: Evidence from  Chinese rural households,  China Economic Review   18, 287 - 308.   Wooldridge , J. M.   2002.  Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Cambridg e ,  MA: MIT Press.   World Bank.  2003.  Reaching  the  rural poor: A renewed  strategy for  rural  development.  Washington, DC.   Xu  X,  Jeffrey  S .   R .,   1998.  Efficiency  and  technical  progress  in  traditional  and  modern  agriculture: Evidence from rice production in Chin a.  Agric. Econ.   18: 157 – 165.   Yang, D. T. 1997. China's Land Arrangements and Rural Labor Mobility.  China Economic  Review 8  (2): 101 - 15.   Yang ,   D .   T .   2004. Education and Allocative Efficiency: Household Income Growth during  Rural Reforms in China.  Journal of   Development Economics . 74: 137 – 162 .   Yao,  Y.  2000.  “The  Development  of  the  Land  Lease  Market  in  Rural  China.”  Land  Economics , Vol. 76(2): 252 - 266.   Yao,  Y.  2004.  “Land  Tenure  Choice  in  Chinese  Villages:  The  Rational  versus  the  Political Model.”  Land Econom ics , 80(4): 477 - 488   Yu  X.  and  G.  Zhao ,  2009 .   Chinese  Agricultural   Development  in  30  Year:  A  Literature  Review .   Frontiers of Economics in China , Vo.4(4): 633 - 648.   Zhang, Y., Wang, X., Glauben, T., and B ruemmer, B., 2011 . The impact of land reallocation  on t echnical efficiency: evidence from China.  Agricultural Economics , forthcoming.                Lease Function ( 5 .a)   Efficiency Function ( 5 .b)   E   L   Figure 1. Equilibrium of Lease Activity and Technical Efficiency   A   B  11     Table  1 .   Estimation Results of the Production Function       Fixed - Effects Model   Fixed - Effects Stochastic Frontier Model       Full Sample   Non - Lease   Lease   Full Sample   Non - Lease   Lease       Coef.   t   Coef.   t   Coef.   t   Coef.   t   Coef.   t   Coef.   t   Ln ( Land)   0.3550   1.80*   0.1193   0.55   0.8433   1.29   0.7946   4.68***   0.6036   3.30***   1.6039   3.47***   Ln(Labor)   0.2255   1.07   0.0543   0.23   0.1582   0.20   - 0.1779   - 1.04   - 0.2515   - 1.36   - 0.8019   - 1.75*   Ln(Capital)   0.0698   0.58   0.0876   0.65   0.1058   0.27   0.0412   0.51   0.0443   0.50   0.2046   0.95   Ln (Intermediate )   - 0.4014   - 1.98**   - 0.2474   - 1.11   - 1.2471   - 1.83*   - 0.5229   - 2.96***   - 0.3944   - 2.07**   - 1.3294   - 2.59***   Ln ( Land)^2   - 0.0084   - 0.45   - 0.0387   - 1.83*   0.1296   2.00**   0.0280   1.69*   - 0.0007   - 0.04   0.2172   5.66***   Ln(Labor)^2   - 0.0228   - 0.95   - 0.0003   - 0.01   0.0207   0.24   0.0387   1.88*   0.0400   1.83*   0.1779   3.35***   Ln(Capital)^2   - 0.0024   - 0.38   - 0.0037   - 0.55   0.0187   0.87   0.0053   1.33   0.0047   1.11   0.0094   0.86   Ln (Intermedi ate)^2   0.0705   3.22***   0.0524   2.11**   0.2109   3.18***   0.0885   4.67***   0.0742   3.58***   0.1817   4.04***   Ln ( Land)*Ln(Labor)   0.0116   0.32   - 0.0221   - 0.55   0.1426   1.12   - 0.0830   - 2.70***   - 0.0888   - 2.71***   - 0.0899   - 1.22   Ln ( Land)*Ln(Capital)   0.0200   1.35   0.0240   1.44   0.02 64   0.55   0.0306   2.46**   0.0294   2.16**   0.0116   0.43   Ln ( Land)*Ln (Intermediate)   - 0.0632   - 1.90*   - 0.0001   0.00   - 0.2854   - 3.09***   - 0.0891   - 3.03***   - 0.0460   - 1.43   - 0.2642   - 4.14***   Ln(Labor)*Ln(Capital)   0.0183   1.20   0.0199   1.17   - 0.0192   - 0.38   0.0030   0.26   0.0073   0.58   - 0.0477   - 1.67*   Ln(Labor)*Ln (Intermediate)   0.0233   0.59   0.0274   0.62   - 0.0331   - 0.28   0.0346   1.02   0.0427   1.16   - 0.0095   - 0.12   Ln(Capital)*Ln (Intermediate)   - 0.0214   - 1.38   - 0.0225   - 1.30   - 0.0661   - 1.34   - 0.0318   - 2.46***   - 0.0340   - 2.42**   - 0.0268   - 0.92   Time Trend   - 0.0 427   - 7.81***   - 0.0474   - 7.21***   - 0.0193   - 1.42   - 0.0121   - 1.35   - 0.0263   - 2.89***   0.0084   0.78   Intercept   6.4440   7.27***   6.3556   6.43***   9.1014   2.97***   8.1267   11.57***   7.9365   10.57***   10.3193   5.23***                 0.0497   [0.0086]   0.0493   [0.0095]   41.1793   [63.0194]                 0.2351   [0.0076]   0.2359   [0.0087]   0.1415   [0.0108]                   0.1745   [0.0262]   0.1729   [0.0293]   0.9966   [0.0052]   Sample Size   2320   1858   462   2320   1858   462   LR - Test   Chi 2(16)  = 433.09***   LR chi2(12) =  147.43***   Note: *, ** and *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1%   level s of significance , respectively.              Standard errors are reported in  square brackets .        12     Table  2 .    Land Lease Function     Lease Area   IV Tobit Model   Tobit Model   Coef.   Z   Coef.   Z   Efficiency   15.470   4.44***   23.201   23.00***   Household Labor Share   - 0.596   - 0 .96   - 0.648   - 1.06   Household Head Education   - 0.627   - 3.02***   - 0.621   - 3.05***   Household Head Age   0.001   0.12   - 0.001   - 0.10   Ln(Capital)   0.435   4.47***   0.389   4.18***   Share of Machinery in Capital   0.572   0.97   0.841   1.49   Off - Farm Wage   0.019   1.54   0.026   2.30**   Vil lage Rent per mu   0.000   - 1.47   0.000   - 1.28   Own Land Size   - 0.372   - 3.31***   - 0.304   - 2.88***   Household Size   0.342   2.82***   0.320   2.70***   Ln(Levies)   0.302   2.47**   0.363   3.14***   Land Size per Parcel   0.442   1.49   0.555   2.02**   Average Household Education   0.352   0.53   0.395   0.60   Time trend   0.401   4.05***   0.432   4.51***   Intercept   - 20.563   - 7.79***   - 25.605   - 17.05***   Test of Exogeneity for Efficiency   chi2(1) = 5.19**     Log Likelihood   - 257.683   - 1314.372                                                                 Note: The   cluster technical efficiency is used as an instrument for technical efficiency.                                                                           *, ** and *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1%   levels of significance , respectively.       13     Table  3 .   Technique Eff iciency Function     Pooled Regression   Fixed - Effects Regression   IV Regression   OLS   IV Regression   OLS   IV Regression   Coef.   T   Coef.   T   Coef.   Z   Coef.   t   Coef.   t   Lease Area   0.064   7.28 ***   0.108   35.86 ***   0.039   4.20 ***   0.090   32.06 ***   0.003   0.30   (Lease Area) 2   - 0.00 1   - 5.68 ***   - 0.002   - 27.26 ***   - 0.001   - 3.82 ***   - 0.002   - 25.84 ***       Land Size per Parcel   - 0.022   - 4.37 ***   - 0.023   - 4.76 ***   0.006   0.93   - 0.008   - 1.57   0.014   1.82 *   Average Household Education   0.001   0.10   0.006   0.46   0.020   1.07   0.016   0.98   0.021   1.02   Household Head Edu cation   0.003   0.62   0.003   0.69   0.006   0.72   0.013   1.84 *   0.003   0.32   Household Head Age   0.000   1.27   0.000   1.30   0.000   - 0.11   0.000   0.63   0.000   - 0.34   Ln(Capital)   - 0.002   - 0.79   - 0.003   - 1.91 *   0.002   0.70   0.000   - 0.15   0.004   1.26   Share of Machinery in Capital   - 0.048   - 4.1 4 ***   - 0.050   - 4.66 ***   - 0.003   - 0.13   - 0.046   - 2.54 **   0.016   0.65   Share of Grain Area in Land   0.017   1.26   0.032   2.64 ***   0.023   1.84 *   0.025   2.18 **   0.027   1.89 *   Household Size   - 0.002   - 0.76   - 0.003   - 1.13   0.001   0.19   - 0.003   - 0.88   0.003   0.73   Village Rent Per mu   0.000   - 0.17   0.000   0.31               Own Land Size   - 0.001   - 0.76   0.001   0.66   - 0.003   - 1.84 *   0.001   1.26   - 0.005   - 2.60 ***   Time Trend   - 0.009   - 4.31 ***   - 0.010   - 5.26 ***   - 0.010   - 6.54 ***   - 0.012   - 8.61 ***   - 0.009   - 5.22 ***   Intercept   0.624   29.24 ***   0.616   31.34 ***   0.557   16.61 ***   0.571   19.14 ***   0.538   13.72 ***   F - tests for Fixed - Effects       F(380,1797) = 6.15 ***   F(384, 1868) = 7.32 ***   F(380,1798) =6.40 ***   Hausman Tests for Exogeneity   chi2(12) = 49.96**   chi2(12) = 58.02***         Note: Household Labor Share, Off - Farm Wage, Shadow Rent,  Sha dow Wage, Ln(Levies), and their second  – order terms and interaction terms are used as  instruments for  L ease  A rea and  the square term of  Lease Area.   *, ** and *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1%   levels of significance , respectively .14     Table A1 .   Explanations to the  variables    Variable   Explanation   Cultivated Land   Actual cultivated land area considering multiple crop seasons (mu)   Allocation of  Agricultural Land   Share of grain area in total cultivated land .   O ther land may be used for  cash   crops   Labor Input   Number of  day*works inputted in agricultural production .   Capital   Value of  physical capital (yuan)   Allocation of   Capital   Share  o f machinery in physical capital   Intermediate Inputs   Aggregat e value   of seed, fertilizer and pesticide inputs (yuan)   Lease   Area   Size of  the l ease d   land area   (mu)   Household Size   Number of household members   Household   Labor Share   Share of effective labor in the household   Education of  Household  Head   1=illitera te , 2=elementary school graduate, 3=secondary school graduate,  5=high school gradu ate and above   Age of  Household Head   Age of the household head   (years)   Off - Farm Wage   A verage off - farm wage in the village (yuan/day)   Village  Rent   Per mu   A verage land  lease   in the village (yuan/mu)   Own Land Size   Own Land Size (mu)   Levies   L evies of the  h ousehold   (yuan)   Shadow  Rent   Shadow  lease   (yuan/mu), computed from production function   Shadow Wage   Shadow wage(yuan/day), computed from production function   Cluster efficiency   The average efficiency of the other farmers in the village that year   Land Size   per Parcel   mu per parcel, measur e   of  land fragment ation   Average Household  Education   Share of the household members with secondary school  education   or above      